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Abstract 
Escalating social practices spread dynamically, as they take hold. They are self-
fulfilling and contagious. This article examines two central social practices, trust and 
corruption, which may be characterized as alternative economic lubricants. 
Corruption can be a considerable instrument of flexibility while trust may be an 
alternative to vigilance (or a collective regime of sanctions). Rational equilibrium 
explanations and psychological accounts of trust and corruption are rejected in favour 
of a model open to multiple feed-backs. Although there can be too much trust and too 
little corruption, and (unsurprisingly) too little trust and too much corruption, a state 
is unattainable in which these forces are in balance. Practices of trust alone can form 
stable equilibria, but it is claimed that such states are undesirable for economic and 
moral reasons. By contrast, practices of corruption are inherently unstable. 
Implications for strategies of control in organizational relations are drawn. 
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Introduction 
Trust and corruption appear to be opposite social forces. A trusted agent is held to the 
performance of a given (or implicit) undertaking while a corrupt attitude remains 
permanently open to changing incentives. Not only is ‘[E]very deal you cut ... a fresh 
deal’, as Jon Elster puts it (1989: 272, n.107), quoting a novel on Chicago’s machine 
politics. In an environment of corruption, every deal you cut may be renegaded on. 
 
Corruption can be a considerable instrument of flexibility. It may keep channels open 
under circumstances associated with personalist styles of decision-making, or changes 
in governments, boards or policies (Leff 1964: 396). Corruption therefore can be a 
socio-economic lubricant. Transactions may be carried out which, in its absence, 
would have folded. Trust, too, has been praised for its lubricating effects (Arrow 
1974: 23). As an alternative to vigilance (or a collective regime of sanctions) it may 
significantly reduce the costs of social and economic cooperation. 
 
So are trust and corruption alternative lubricants? Do we have to choose one over the 
other to govern exchange relations? This paper argues that trust and corruption both 
are dynamic social practices which respond in complex ways to feed-backs. Although 
there can be too much trust and too little corruption, and (unsurprisingly) too little 
trust and too much corruption, a state is unattainable in which these forces are in 
balance. Practices of trust alone can form stable equilibria, but it is claimed that such 
states are undesirable for economic and moral reasons. By contrast, practices of 
corruption are inherently unstable. 
 
This analysis is anchored in politico-philosophical arguments, leading to a critique of 
static accounts of the psychological condition of affective trust. The idea of trust 
inventories conducted by traditional empirical instruments is fundamentally flawed 
(e.g. Cummings and Bromiley 1996). Similarly, it is shown to be misleading to 
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approach dynamic practices from a narrowly business ethical angle, as it is commonly 
done for corruption (e.g. Mahoney 1995). 
 
The paper is structured in the following way. The first section contemplates the nature 
of socio-economic lubricants. Then rational equilibrium models are assessed and a 
dynamic model of escalating social practices is sketched, following philosophical 
models of ‘convention’. Thirdly, static, non -systemic accounts of trust and corruption 
are criticized. Finally, implications for strategies of control in organizational relations 
are drawn. 
 
 
The Nature of Socio-Economic Lubricants 
Most social interaction and economic exchange depends on a leap beyond the 
available evidence. In a post-barter society, goods, services, information typically are 
not transacted simultaneously. One agent must put itself into the other’s hand, at least 
for a limited period. An efficient socio-economic lubricant facilitates this move.  
 
For trust, Karen Jones (1996: 22) identifies two kinds of leaps: ‘when trust is 
governed by forward-looking or instrumental considerations, and when trust is 
governed by backward-looking considerations of evidence but our responses seem to 
outstrip the evidence’. (Lewis and Weigert 1985 introduced the idea of cognitive 
leaps into the trust literature; this terminology is also adopted by Bradach and Eccles 
1989). Corrupt practices leap via changes in the incentive structure of a transaction 
partner, by offering bribes or enticements of power. Corruption, in this light, has no 
past. It is a forward-looking leap, relying on ambiguous instrumental considerations. 
By resorting to corrupt methods, an agent may succeed in reducing the immediate 
uncertainty associated with emerging business systems. But equally, engaging in 
corrupt practices may lead to procrastination and delay for the purpose of increasing 
size and number of bribes, involving spiraling costs for competing agents. 
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Socio-economic lubricants are related to John Dunn’s notion of ‘modality of action’, 
understood as ‘a more or less consciously chosen policy for handling the freedom of 
other human agents or agencies’ (Dunn 1988: 73). In adopting trusting or corrupt 
social practices, agents attempt to overcome failures of control. 
 
Socio-economic lubricants can be institutionalized as ‘social capital’ (Coleman 1988) 
serving all members of a network of transactors (Dei Ottati 1994), or all members of a 
society (Fukuyama 1995). This is most plausible for trust which may be backed up by 
mechanisms of reputation formation or a collective regime of sanctions. By contrast, 
the lubricating benefits of corruption appear to wane if it develops into a ‘system of 
well-defined, transferable rights. Once that happens, the economy gets stuck there’ 
(Cheung 1996: 1). 
 
In the next section, a more precise conception of the lubricating leap is developed. Is 
it a rational or non-rational process? How do individual leaps spread into fields of 
institutional practices? 
 
 
Models of ‘leaping’ Socio-Economic Practices 
Social scientists operating within the rational choice paradigm have concentrated on 
forward-looking leaps. They present situations of trust as ‘a subclass of those 
involving risk’ (Coleman, 1990: 91). The most concise definition of trust in this vain 
comes from Deutsch (1962). According to Deutsch, trust is behaviour that  
 
(a) increases one’s vulnerability,  
(b) to another whose behavior is not under one’s control,  
(c) in a situation in which the penalty suffered from abuses of that 
vulnerability is greater than the gains from compliance. 
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In this definition, we recognise the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a game theoretical model 
developed during the 1950s with which Morton Deutsch (a psychologist!) became 
deeply impressed. Within the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, trusting behaviour by a 
player has come to mean choosing the cooperative option (Luce and Raiffa 1985 
[1957]). Deutsch’s question was (which has lost nothing of its topicality), whether 
there was a psychological solution available where, rationally, there appeared to be 
none (Deutsch 1958). I shall return to his concerns later. 
 
In choosing the cooperative ‘trusting’ option in a Prisoner’s Dilemma type situation, a 
person puts herself at hazard – she undertakes a risk. The standard conception of risk 
is in terms of subjective probabilities (Bernstein 1996). Trust, under this conception, 
rests on an implicit assessment that the probability of another person not exploiting 
someone’s vulnerability is high enough for that person to engage in coope rative 
action. Gambetta (1988: 217) claims that ‘there is a degree of convergence’ towards 
this definition of trust, at least amongst contributors to his seminal collection Trust: 
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. 
 
The interchangeable use of the terms trust and risk supports a very narrow forward-
looking conception of the leap. The leap may be rationally required. Thus game-
theorists and transaction cost economists have focused on solving the paradoxical 
nature of the rationality in question: If in prototypal social interaction under partial 
conflict, we are rationally compelled to reject a mutually beneficial outcome (as most 
game theorists think the Prisoners must under the Dominance Principle), the 
prospects for social theory based on the maximizing behaviour of rational individuals 
are rather bleak. (According to the Dominance Principle, ‘it is rational to perform an 
action α if it satisfies the following two conditions: (a) Whatever else may happen, 
doing α will result in your being no worse off than doing any of the other things open 
to you; (b) There is at least one possible outcome in which your having done α makes 
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you better off than you would have been had you done any of the other things open to 
you’; Sainsbury 1988: 56).  
 
Game theoretical analysis of sequential games (Kreps and Wilson 1982) and tit-for-tat 
solutions to repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas (Axelrod 1984) have sought to show that it 
can be calculatively rational to become trusting and trustworthy. Similarly, according 
to Williamson’s  revisionist account (1993), practices of trust as risk should really be 
explained by calculative reasoning within the axioms of transaction cost economics. 
Knowledge about other commitments of a transaction partner, the prospects of repeat 
business, reputation effects within networks of commercial actors all contribute to the 
subjective probabilities assigned to the outcome of risk-taking behaviour. Trust then 
merely reduces the costs of using the market. Trust in this sense is an alternative form 
of contracting. It is ‘commercial exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have 
been devised in support of more efficient exchange’ (Williamson 1993: 463).  
 
If the cooperative leap is rationally required, ‘trust’ as a psychological term does not 
need to be used – that at least is the claim. There are at least three problems with this 
narrowly forward-looking conception of socio-economic lubrication. One weakness is 
that affective trust (as vulnerability beyond rational risk assessment) simply becomes 
inexplicable within the calculative economic framework. Williamson relegates 
affective trust to an obscure psychological condition reserved for ‘personal relations 
in which it really matters’ (483). In Williamson’s socio -economic world, exchange 
institutions need only rely on a ‘functional substitute for trust’, as Granovetter (1985: 
488) critically remarks.  
 
A second, more pertinent weakness of calculative theories is their difficulty to explain 
how socio-economic leaps become possible in the first place. In conditions where 
there is no mutual trust (or its substitute), how could anyone rationally place 
themselves at hazard (Baier 1994: 176). Trust (or its substitute) is hardest to get when 
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it is most needed. (This paradox continues to haunt much of the consultancy literature 
on trust. Flexible organisations with flatter hierarchies require higher levels of 
organisational trust – which has just been sacrificed by redundancies, or the threat 
thereof; cf. Handy 1995).  
 
A third weakness relates to a bizarre implication of calculative accounts: Trusting 
behaviour becomes most rational under institutional conditions of predictability. A 
slave should trust his master more than husband and wife should trust each other. This 
is inefficient as well as morally reprehensible. In one sense, calculative accounts deny 
the insightful conception of trust as a social lubricant. 
 
For corrupt practices, too, rationalistic accounts have had their difficulties. The first 
problem is another version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Competing agen ts would 
benefit to agree on the lowest efficient amount of bribery but do even better if all bar 
one (each individual agent) agreed. A defecting agent offering bribes more readily 
than its competitors reaps the benefits of a controlled environment without spiraling 
costs. Thus systems of corruption should be unstable.  
 
A second problem is located between briber and bribed. I have argued above that 
corruption is best understood as a practice without history (i.e. changing incentive 
structures imply immediate behavioural responses). If the benefits of corrupt practices 
cannot outlast current incentive structures, corrupt practices only appear to render 
volatile environments more predictable. Bribes can act as a lubricant. But their very 
lubricating effect undermines the predictability of socio-economic exchange. 
 
These arguments suggest that the rationalist explication of socio-economic leaps is 
insufficient. Defenders of the role of corruption in correcting market distortion and 
improving allocative efficiency (e.g. Lui 1996) may point out that it is wrong to 
define corruption as a practice without history. I submit that under this interpretation 
 9 
corruption would loose its distinctiveness. Either it turns into a case of standardised 
access payments (which is reasonably well defined and may even be expected to 
supplement low public salaries) or will be submerged under the wider problem of 
trust (regarding repeat performances or transferable rights). 
 
An alternative starting point to modelling ‘leaping’ socio -economic practices may be 
inspired by Albert Hirschman memorable aphorism: 
[Trust (with love and civic spirit) is among those resources] ‘whose supply 
may well increase rather than decrease through use ...; like the ability to speak 
a foreign language or to play the piano, these moral resources are likely to 
become depleted and to atrophy if not used’ (Hirschman 1984: 93).  
 
This rings true. Practices of trust appear to increase and spread with use, so does 
corruption. The expectations implicit in these social practices may be self-fulfilling. If 
trust and corruption are endemic, a dynamic model of socio-economic lubricants may 
be more promising than rational equilibrium approaches.  
 
Thomas Schelling’s theory of focal points is the locus classicus of iterative process of 
social interaction. In a coordinated action, agents try to pick out what they perceive as 
salient features of a situation – salient not to each agent but to what each agent 
expects the interacting agent to expect. Schelling (1960) asked a sample of test 
subjects to name a place in New York City where they would go in the hope of 
finding a partner with whom they are unable to communicate. More than 50 percent 
chose the same place: Grand Central Station. This was in the late 1950s. Today the 
outcome might be different, reminding us that expectations under the notion of 
prominence depend on ‘imaginative leaps and associations of ideas’ (Sugden, 1986: 
121) which change with given historical situations.  
 
The leap required to meet at Grand Central Station is not a rational one. Iterative 
processes look back- and forward. They may be set off by imaginative associations, 
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affective dispositions or chance events. However, they unfold in predictable ways 
once they have developed a critical dynamic. Coordination, then, turns into 
convention. Following philosopher David Lewis (1969), a behavioural regularity R is 
maintained as a convention if  
(a) everyone conforms to R 
(b) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R 
(c) everyone prefers to conform to R since R is a solution to a coordination 
problem. 
 
In the environment of economic exchange, condition (c) should be given a wide 
interpretation, since economic agents have other preferences than those they can only 
satisfy together (game theory calls that a ‘cooperative game’). Still, in dynamic 
economic situations of partial conflict (which game theorists term ‘non-cooperative 
games’) agents may end up in different equilibria (Elster 1989: 39; Peyton Young 
1996). 
 
Lewis reports from 1950s America that in some areas (including Oberlin, Ohio) all 
local phone calls were cut off without warning after three minutes. Soon after the 
practice had began, a convention grew up that when a call was cut off the original 
caller would call back while the called party waited. 
 
The introduction of obligatory cut-offs constitutes an institutional crisis. Agents find 
it problematic to handle the freedom of other agents. In a second phase, caller and 
called party try to match their expectations. Once they encountered success (which 
may take many attempts), the convention will spread rapidly. In a third phase, 
patience after being called will become a way of life in Oberlin, Ohio. People moving 
into the area will be initiated, and the conventions of calling may appear so stable as 
to belie their precarious origins. 
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Note that this whole process, after the initial shock of cut-offs, is driven by nothing 
but expectations feeding back on themselves: I do what I expect you to expect me to 
do, and so on – in ‘infinitely reflexive mutual expectations’ (Schelling 1960: 70). 
Which reasons (as affective dispositions, path-dependent leaps, accidents) could start 
off practices of trust and corruption? Deutsch argues from an empirical study of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma type situations, that we are subject to psychological constraints, 
linking either trusting and trustworthy or suspicious and untrustworthy attitudes. 
Only very few of us are able to be suspicious while being trustworthy or behave 
trustingly while being untrustworthy. Deutsch calls this a constraint of cognitive 
consistency: ‘do unto others as you expect others to do unto you and expect others to 
do unto you as you do unto them’ (Deutsch 1973: 206 note).’   (This constraint is not 
the Golden Rule of ethics: ‘do unto others as you would have others do unto you’).  
 
It is tempting to view corrupt attitudes as violating Deutsch’s constraints of 
consistency. This might account for the fact that corruption does not easily form 
stable practices. In offering a bribe, an agent must be trusting yet prepared to be 
untrustworthy. However, if am agent is consistent in Deutsch’s sense, the dynamics of 
social interaction become more predictable. If two (slightly) trusting and trustworthy 
individuals are paired by chance, mutual expectations will escalate. Other empirical 
tests have indicated that reciprocity may indeed be such a basic element of human 
behaviour (Berg et al. 1995). 
 
The explanation of simple social practices from 1950s America (calling in Oberlin, 
Ohio; meeting at Grand Central Station) elegantly demonstrates the potential of 
dynamic theories, incorporating three distinct processes into one model: (1) 
institutional crisis, (2) dynamic spread from individual to institutional environments, 
(3) apparently stable conventions. Granovetter claims that ‘social relations, rather 
than institutional arrangements or generalised morality, are mainly responsible for the 
production of trust in economic life’ (1985: 491). Dynamic models are promising 
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candidates for such an explanation of socio-economic lubricants. However, they pose 
distinct methodological problems for concrete empirical circumstances because there 
is no clear line from assumptions about the past to present practices. As Elster says 
(1989: 39): ‘people may have similar values, within and across societies, and similar 
institutional structures and yet, for accidental reasons, end up in different equilibria’.  
Related claims are promoted by currently fashionable theories of complexity 
(Kauffman 1993; Thiétart and Forgues 1995), increasing returns (Arthur 1994; 1996) 
and system cybernetics (Beer 1966; Oliver and Montgomery 1998). The following 
section investigates traditional, static psychological and business ethical approaches 
which try to locate recognisable empirical phenomena at a given point in time. 
 
 
Non-Systemic Accounts of Trust and Corruption 
Theories of trust may be grouped into those that treat trust as an explanans or 
explanandum (Craswell 1993). For trust as an explanandum, the reasoning typically 
takes a reconstructive form. Looking at puzzling social practices, such as relying on 
promises when there is a painless opportunity to defect, the theorist stipulates a 
mental attitude – ‘trust’ – which might account for this behaviour. This attitude, then, 
may be given various rationales: ‘calculative’ – a route favoured, for example, by 
transaction cost economists, or ‘conventional’ – supported by dynamic theories.  
 
One might argue that in order to embark on a meaningful reconstructive account of 
trust, one needs a good prior conception of the psychological phenomenon called 
‘trust’. Any theory has to start somewhere. Thus psychologists have treated trust as an 
explanans, a complex syndrome in need of explication which may then play a part in 
various socio-economic theories. 
 
How have psychologists approached the affective condition of trust? Cummings and 
Bromiley (1996: 303) define trust  
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‘as an individual’s belief or a common belief among a group of individuals 
that another individual or group (a) makes good-faith efforts to behave in 
accordance with any commitments both explicit or implicit, (b) is honest in 
whatever negotiations preceded such commitments, and (c) does not take 
excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available’.  
 
Butler and Cantrell (1984), later adapted by Schindler and Thomas (1993), develop 
five dimensions of trust which partly overlap with Cummings and Bromiley’s three -
fold account:  
 
An individual A’s trust in individual B implies that B  
(i)  is honest and truthful (condition of Integrity) 
(ii) has the technical and interpersonal knowledge and skills needed to 
perform (condition of Competence)  
(iii) is reliable and predictable (condition of Consistency) 
(iv) is willing to protect and save face (condition of Loyalty) 
(v) is willing to share ideas and information freely (condition of 
Openness). 
 
These psychological dimensions are supposed to explicate what we expect in trusting 
a person. Both sets of conditions (which are the ones most widely used in empirical 
studies of organizations) suffer from problems of circularity and conceptual 
parsimony. I shall set out these problems, and then argue that they are indicative of a 
deeper fallacy of psychological accounts of trust. 
 
Successful social interaction (be it coordinating, contractual or affective) incorporates 
two assumptions which continue into trust relationships: 
  
(1) the assumption of sincerity, i.e. that the interacting agent means to 
deliver what has been undertaken, and 
  
(2) the assumption of competence, i.e. that the interacting agent is able 
to deliver what has been undertaken.  
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Traces of these assumptions can be found in Cummings and Bromiley’s conditions  
(a) of behavioural reliability and (b) of honesty. In Butler and Cantrell’s list, they are 
mainly spread over conditions (i) integrity (as honesty) and (ii) competence (as 
knowledge) and (iii) consistency (as reliability). What lifts a trusting relationship 
beyond a contractual interaction, however, is a third element:  
 
(3) the assumption of good will  
 
If spelled out, this should subsume a whole range of provisions, including 
assumptions  
 
(3’) not to deliberately withhold or manipulate relevant information to 
an interacting agent, leading to false expectations; 
(3’’) to take reasonable care not to lead the interacting agent to form 
false expectations;  
(3’’’) not to take excessive advantage of unforeseen opportunities or 
changing circumstances. 
 
(For a careful philosophical account of principles implicit in the utterance ‘Trust 
me!’, see Scanlon 1990). We can now see that the psychological acc ounts of 
Cummings and Bromiley, and Butler and Cantrell liberally sprinkle these normative 
assumptions over different dimensions. Butler and Cantrell’s condition (iv) ‘loyalty’ 
is a variation of (3’’’) while (v) ‘openness’ subsumes (3’) and (3’’), which can also be 
said of their condition (i) ‘integrity’ conflating sincerity with good will. In the case of 
Cummings and Bromiley, their condition (b) ‘honesty’ covers my assumptions (3’) 
and (3’’) while (c) reflects (3’’’), the assumption not to take advantage.  
 
Conceptually improved psychological accounts of trust should separate out predictive 
and normative elements.  Would such an account anchor a more satisfactory theory of 
trust? Cummings and Bromiley present the contrast between Williamson’s transaction 
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cost economics and their own view of socially embedded human interaction as one of 
pessimism vs. optimism (1996: 303). My analysis suggests that the contrast is rather 
between reconstructive and descriptive theoretical approaches. Williamson does not 
claim that we think calculatively when we keep our promises, but that our behaviour 
can be explained in that light. Williamson admits that  
‘[p]ervasive calculativeness notwithstanding, the rhetoric of exchange often 
employs the language of promises, trust, favors, and cooperativeness. That is 
understandable, in that the artful use of language can produce deals that would 
be scuttled by abrasive calculativeness. If, however, the basic deal is shaped 
by objective factors, then calculativeness (credibility, hazards, safeguards, net 
benefits) is where the crucial action resides’ (1993: 467, n. 70).  
 
Psychological accounts stubbornly point to a normative element in trusting behaviour 
(i.e. the assumption of good will) that reconstructive, calculative accounts try hard to 
explain away. Psychological accounts, again, have little to say on which grounds 
trusting agents leap beyond the vigilance, guiding many of our socio-economic 
interactions. By contrast, reconstructive accounts insist that it is often ill advised to 
expect good will on narrowly forward-looking considerations. This stand-off is 
doubly unsatisfactory. In eliminating normative elements, reconstructive calculative 
accounts are unnecessarily restrictive while descriptive psychological ‘inventories’ 
become quite meaningless without a model of the underlying leap beyond vigilance. 
 
Practices of trust are prone to these theoretical problems because they often appear to 
be quite open and stable. Corruption does not possess that virtue. Signals need to be 
coded, intermediaries used, formal agreements shunned. Corruption indeed may be 
corrupting (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 8). Thus practices of corruption reveal the pitfalls 
of non-systemic analysis more immediately. 
 
In the vast politico-economical literature on the subject, no agreement has emerged on 
why corruption occurs, which system is most likely to promote it, and what policies 
governments or organizations ought to pursue. Deregulation and market forces have 
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been both blamed for and presented as the solution to burgeoning corruption. In a 
recent Institute of Development Studies (IDS) volume, economic liberalisation is held 
responsible for rising corruption in South Korea (Kong 1996) and China (White 1996) 
while the processes of democratization are said to have contributed in Latin America 
(Little 1996).  
 
Corruption may be bad because bribed preferential treatment leads to an inefficient 
allocation of resources related to the deficiency of monopolies (Becker 1994). Yet 
conversely, in societies where favouritism is rampant, efficiency may be promoted by 
corruption. It cannot be assumed that relatives or friends of bureaucrats are good 
entrepreneurs but the highest bidder for a public contract may well be the most 
efficient firm (Bayley 1966). 
 
While it seems pretty clear that dictatorial regimes lacking corruption are 
economically less successful, and corruption ‘can help offset the inefficiencies of a 
communist or hierarchical system, as the economy makes a transition toward private 
property’ (Cheung 1996: 1), policy impl ications are generally not well supported. 
India’s first premier Nehru claimed (Myrdal 1968: 408 -9): ‘Merely shouting from the 
house-tops that everybody is corrupt creates an atmosphere of corruption... People 
feel they live in a climate of corruption and they get corrupted themselves.’ By 
contrast, public outrage eliminated an entire governing elite from politics in Italy: ‘In 
February 1992 the discovery of a minor instance of political corruption in Milan 
triggered a broad judiciary investigation which rapidly led to the collapse of the 
political regime that had governed Italy for over forty years’ (Giglioli 1996:  381). 
 
Another study (Rijckeghem and Weder 1997) conducted under the wings of the IMF 
(which is considering tying loans to specific anti-corruption measures) sought to 
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establish a correlation between low public sector wages and high corruption. They 
found that ‘while higher pay for public servants may indeed reduce corruption, the 
benefits may be smaller than the added costs’ (Economist, August 16th, 1997). 
 
I suggest that our limited theoretical understanding of corruption is no accident, nor is 
our lack of practical remedies. For reasons yet to be fully explored, corruption does 
not appear to form stable practices. Attempts to curb corruption by clamp downs from 
the top (‘war against crime’) are often unsuccessful. Tinkering with established 
practices may go both ways, escalating or diminishing corruption. 
  
There is some support for this claim from recent game theoretical modelling and 
catastrophe theory: Biccieri and Rovelli (1995) show that the presence of a small 
number of honest players drives a corrupt system towards a catastrophic point. The 
following revolutionary systemic transition results in a different equilibrium, which is 
cooperative in that all players choose to be conditionally honest. A catastrophe model 
of corruption and black markets, developed by Vandemortel and Cornelisse (1994) 
allows two-way relations with different reaction speeds:  
‘The exercise illustrates ... how corruption – itself a function of morality – can 
taint morality and, thereby, lower the threshold for corruptive practices. Thus, 
beyond a certain point corruption can become self-propellant. For a similar 
reason corruption can linger even after a drastic reduction of public 
intervention.’  
 
These are of course a priori claims, derived from axiomatic settings; different rules 
would produce different results. Other recent game-theoretical treatments of 
corruption include Manion 1996, and David and Fechtinger 1996.  
 
If practices of corruption are indeed dynamic, traditional business ethical analysis is 
likely to be disappointing: According to Mahoney (1995: 226), ‘Commercial bribery 
can be faulted ethically on three general grounds: as being bad for business, bad for 
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the participants, and bad for the society in which it occurs’. Business ethical treatment 
of corruption suffers from similar deficiencies as psychological accounts of trust. 
Without a model of the processes of ‘leaping’ socio -economic practices, outcomes are 
difficult to evaluate. 
 
 
Trust, Corruption and Control 
Practices of trust and corruption exist in all societies. Corruption generally is thought 
to be a bad thing, while trust is almost universally welcome as a source of social 
order. In this paper, I suggested reasons why the analysis must be rather more 
complicated. Socio-economic lubricants are responses to failures of control. 
Reconstructive calculative models of trust explain stable, hierarchical environments 
as the most suitable to trust, but these might be neither economically beneficial nor 
morally welcome. Corruption can help here. Vice versa, without any leaps of 
vulnerability facilitated by trust, the world would be even bleaker. A trustless 
environment is one of permanent institutional crisis, a view reflected in Plato’s claim 
of distrust as an evil associated with sea-faring traders: they might not come back 
(Laws 4.705a, cited in Baier 1994: 97).  
 
Dynamic accounts might explain how the threat of permanent institutional crisis can 
be overcome, as trust increases with use. But the process is going to be less tightly 
controlled than Charles Sabel hopes in his exploration of how ‘thin’ or vigilant trust 
can be transformed into ‘thick’ human relations (1993: 1143):  
‘trust is both a thick and thin human relation. It is thick in that each party must 
suppose ... that the other have at least an intuitive understanding of what it 
means to make oneself vulnerable to others and are capable – because there is 
no other choice – of sometimes doing so. But it is thin in that it supposes that 
each party might decide after due and prudential deliberation, and well 
understanding the gravity of the act, to put its trust elsewhere’ 
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Sabel briefly considers auto-poetic, reflexive models (1153, n. 16) but settles in the 
end for a language closer to theories of collective action. A feed-back account of trust 
appears to be better placed to supersede the conceptual dichotomy of the economic 
and the psychological. From a thin, vigilant, but not fully calculative motivational 
source of reciprocity (supported as cognitive consistency), rich affective trust may 
spring, spreading – as it takes hold – from individual to generalised, collective trust.  
 
If ‘leaping’ socio -economic practices are ‘self-fulfilling and contagious’ (Baier 1994: 
197) following iterative, dynamic models, a balance between vigilant, calculative 
trust and the vulnerable trust of personal relations will be hard to strike. Violations of 
trust may lead to a sudden rupture of the dynamic spiral of social practices rather than 
a gradual decline. As Kelley and Stahelski show (1970), ‘[t]rust when violated, is 
more likely to turn into suspicion than negated suspicion is to turn into trust’.  For 
most of its history, trust remains precarious. This suggest that there can only be 
limited control over the ‘state of trust’ within and between organizations. Without a 
careful processural analysis, snap-shots of the ‘state of trust’ in specific organisational 
settings can be entirely misleading. Corruption, too, does not appear to respond well 
to strategies of control. 
 
The most promising methodological approaches to ‘leaping’ socio -economic practices 
still date back to the 1960s and 1970s: Deutsch’s work on the resolution of conflicts 
(1958; 1962; 1973) or Zand’s (1972) spiral reinforcement model of trust, from 
increasing vulnerability (1), over disclosure of information, thoughts and feeling (2), 
accepting the influence of others (3), loosening control (4) back to trust (1). These 
approaches should be elaborated into dynamic feed-back model in the sense defended 
here. Meanwhile, we might do best in following Dr. Johnson’s advice ( Rambler, 
1750): 
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‘It is happier to be sometimes cheated than not to trust.’  
 
And we might add (Anonymous): 
‘It is happier sometimes to cheat than always to trust.’ 
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